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ABSTRACT	GOES	HERE	
	
Since	 research	 was	 conducted	 on	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 Islamic	 State	 (IS)	 and	 the	 fall	 of	 Mosul	 in	 late	
2014/early	 2015	 that	 culminated	 in	 the	 writing	 of	 “The	 Enemy	Within:	 ISIS	 and	 the	 Conquest	 of	
Mosul”	 much	 has	 changed	 in	 Iraq.	 With	 varying	 degrees	 of	 success,	 the	 Iraqi	 government	 has	
managed	 to	 retake	 several	 Iraqi	 cities,	 districts	 and	 towns,	 but	 with	 forces	 that	 have	 a	 distinctly	
sectarian	hue.	Direct	 support	has	been	provided	by	 Iran	 in	 the	 form	of	weapons,	 funding,	 training	
and	military	personnel	 to	a	 range	of	Shi’i	militia	organizations.	These	organizations,	expanded	and	
empowered	 by	 Ayatollah	 Ali	 Sistani’s	 fatwa	 that	 led	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	Hashd	 al-Sha’abi	 (or	
Popular	Mobilisation	Forces	-	PMF),	have	limited	IS’s	opportunities	to	advance,	but	in	so	doing	have	
furthered	the	sectarian	and	ethnic	divides	that	now	run	deep	in	Iraq’s	society	and	political	life.	It	is	
also	crucial	to	understand	the	very	significant	impact	Western	airstrikes	on	IS	positions	continues	to	
have.	Without	these	airstrikes,	neither	the	Shi’i	militia	nor	the	ISF	have	managed	to	make	headway	
against	IS	in	battles	in	Tikrit,	Baiji,	or	Ramadi,	and	Bashir	has	not	yet	been	attacked	because	of	a	lack	
of	agreement	on	air	 support	 to	 the	Hashd	al-Sha’abi.	A	 similar	picture	can	be	 seen	 in	 the	north	–	
without	 support	provided	 from	 the	air	by	Western	airforces,	 the	Kurdish	peshmerga	 forces	would	
struggle	to	maintain	their	frontline	against	IS.	Worryingly,	none	of	these	areas	of	engagement	match	
Mosul	in	terms	of	scale,	complexity	of	the	urban	environment,	determination	of	IS	to	hold	the	city,	
and	the	length	of	time	IS	has	had	to	prepare	defences.		
	
But	 an	 assault	 on	 Mosul	 seems	 to	 be	 looming.	 ISF	 brigades	 have	 moved	 to	 Makhmour,	 Kurdish	
leaders	are	now	expressing	their	desire	to	be	involved	(arguably	for	their	own	political	reasons),	and	
there	is	a	sensitive	discussion	taking	place	between	exiled	Sunni	elites	from	Nineveh,	Salahadin,	and	
Diyala	about	the	problems	of	seeing	the	HaS	present	 in	any	retaking	of	 territory	held	by	 IS.	 It	also	
seems	that	the	Obama	administration	may	be	viewing	the	retaking	of	Mosul	as	a	 final	 ‘success’	 to	
round	 up	 the	 President’s	 final	 term,	 and	 the	 confidence	 of	 US	 government	 and	military	 forces	 in	
particular	suggests	that	the	invasion	of	Mosul	may	be	much	sooner,	rather	than	later,	in	the	year.	In	
light	of	this,	what	would	have	previously	been	viewed	as	a	premature,	even	fanciful,	line	of	thinking	
is	now	being	voiced	as	legitimate	questions.	What	can	the	international	community	expect	in	a	“day	
after”	scenario	if	IS	is	defeated	and	removed	from	power	in	Mosul?	Is	it	even	possible	to	do	this	–	to	
surgically	 remove	 the	 IS	 organization	 from	 the	 city	 and	 governorate,	 when	 it	 has	 had	 some	 two	
years,	if	not	longer,	to	deepen	its	roots	into	the	socio-political	fabric	of	Mosul	and	Nineveh?	What	do	
Iraqis	 in	Mosul	 think	 about	 IS,	 and	what	 are	 their	 thoughts	 on	 the	 recapture	 of	 their	 city	 by	 the	
central	 government	 in	 Baghdad?	Would	 they	 view	 the	 recapture	 of	Mosul	 as	 liberation,	 or	 just	 a	
transition	 from	 one	 repressive	 system	 and	 back	 into	 the	 fold	 of	 another?	 How	 could	 the	 Iraqi	
government	assure	Maslawis,	as	the	people	of	Mosul	are	known,	that	the	recapture	of	Mosul	would	
benefit	 them?	 These	 questions	 are	 important.	 Every	 iteration	 of	 Arab	 Sunni	 opposition	 to	 have	
emerged	 since	 2003	 has	 been	 deeper,	 better	 organized,	 and	more	 violent	 than	 that	 which	 came	
before.	Lessons	were	also	learned	–	from	the	previous	organization’s	experience,	and	the	manner	in	
which	it	was	defeated	–	to	make	the	next	iteration	even	more	capable.	If	‘the	day	after’	in	Mosul	is	
not	carefully	managed	to	some	pre-defined	yet	agile	notion	of	 ‘success’,	then	the	result	could	well	
be	another	round	of	low-scale	insurgency	leading	to	a	violent	Sunni	rebellion	in	subsequent	years.		
	
To	 answer	 these	 questions,	 this	 briefing	 paper	 has	 been	 divided	 into	 the	 following	 sections,	 each	
focused	on	a	different	actor	or	faction	that	has	an	impact	on	the	future	of	Mosul.	The	first	section,	
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and	the	one	with	the	most	emphasis,	will	assess	the	feelings	of	the	people	of	Mosul	towards	IS,	with	
particular	 reference	 to	 their	method	of	 rule,	 the	 economic	 situation,	 and	other	 amenities	 such	 as	
health	that	are	all	part	and	parcel	of	living	within	a	state,	as	IS	claims	they	are.	The	second	section	
will	 examine	 Maslawi	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 Iraqi	 government	 and	 the	 various	 Shia	 militias,	 in	
particular	 the	 Popular	 Mobilisation	 Forces,	 particularly	 in	 light	 of	 reports	 of	 various	 atrocities	
committed	by	these	forces	in	their	recapture	of	other	cities	like	Tikrit	and	Ramadi.	The	third	section	
will	 investigate	 how	 the	 people	 of	Mosul	 feel	 towards	members	 of	 the	 international	 community,	
with	actors	ranging	from	Turkey	to	the	United	States.	The	final	section	includes	reflections	from	Arab	
sheikhs	in	exile	in	Kurdistan,	as	well	as	some	issues	concerning	potential	Kurdish	involvement	in	the	
liberation	of	Mosul.		
	
This	 briefing	 paper	 is	 not	 based	 on	 any	 extensive	 surveys	 conducted	 in	Mosul.	 Due	 to	 resources	
available,	 the	 security	 situation	 in	 Iraq	 and	 other	 issues	 relating	 to	 the	 conflict,	 it	 has	 not	 been	
possible	to	conduct	fieldwork	in	Iraqi	government	controlled	territory,	and	certainly	not	in	Mosul.	As	
such,	the	attitudes	surveyed	within	this	paper	come	from	a	number	of	interviews	already	conducted	
for	 the	 more	 substantive	 research	 paper	 mentioned	 above,	 and	 from	 follow-up	 interviews	
conducted	in	late	February	2016	with	the	same	respondents	as	well	as	brief	interactions	with	those	
who	have	been	recently	smuggled	out	of	Mosul.	The	paper	also	benefits	from	extensive	interviews	
undertaken	 in	 the	Kurdistan	Region	of	 Iraq	since	 the	 fall	of	Mosul	 in	 June	2014	until	 the	spring	of	
2016.	This	data	was	also	supplemented	by	conversations	with	sources	who	are	in	daily	contact	with	
people	in	Mosul.	As	such,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	analysis	contained	herein	provides	us	with	
a	snapshot	of	what	is	happening	in	Mosul,	and	not	an	all-encompassing	canvas	that	paints	a	detailed	
picture.	 Further	 research	 is	 thus	 required,	 and	 this	 paper	 should	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 beginning	 into	 a	
much	broader	enquiry.	
	
Attitudes	towards	IS:	
	
As	 a	 city	 known	 for	 its	 extraordinarily	 large	 number	 of	 Iraqi	military	 and	 security	 service	 officers,	
Mosul	has	never	been	particularly	fond	of	groups	and	organisations	that	work	outside	the	confines	
of	 state	 institutions	 and	 civil	 discipline.	 Mosul	 has	 long	 been	 a	 city	 with	 disproportionate	
representation	in	the	defence	and	security	apparatus	of	the	Iraqi	state	as	compared	to	other	cities,	
even	Sunni	Arab	ones,	since	the	establishment	of	modern	Iraq	in	the	early	20th	Century.	Mosul	was	
home	 to	 Ottoman	 military	 training	 colleges,	 and	 thus	 it	 became	 the	 home	 of	 the	 Iraqi	 military	
establishment	 in	 the	 nascent	 state.	 This	 reality	 did	 not	 change	 even	 during	 the	 rule	 of	 Saddam	
Hussein	even	though	he	was	accused	of	favouring	appointments	from	his	clan	or	hometown	of	Tikrit.	
Although	 the	 reasons	 behind	 this	 are	 not	 directly	 pertinent	 to	 the	 current	 study,	 it	 demonstrates	
that	Mosul	has	long	been	a	city	that	has	had	loyalty	to	the	notion	of	the	Iraqi	state,	government	and	
society.	It	is	perhaps	because	of	this	history	that	Mosul	and	Nineveh	remained	the	base	for	several	
‘former	regime	element’	groupings	after	2003.		
	
Therefore,	 it	was	not	a	surprise	when	every	respondent,	without	exception,	displayed	antagonistic	
attitudes	 towards	 not	 only	 IS,	 but	 also	 al-Qaeda,	 Ansar	 al-Islam	 (a	 Kurdish	 al-Qaeda	 affiliated	
organisation)	 and	 other	 groups	 they	 did	 not	 identify	 as	 being	 sufficiently	 “Iraqi”	 or	 genuinely	
“Islamic”	 in	 their	 objectives	 and	 methods.v	 Such	 attitudes	 hearken	 back	 to	 a	 poignant	 quote	
contained	within	the	original	research	where	the	only	female	participant	stated,	“…No	one	likes	al-
Qaeda,	 most	 of	 their	 fighters	 are	 not	 Iraqi	 anyway…”.vi	 The	 same	 participant,	 who	 is	 still	 closely	
connected	to	her	city	and	family	living	there,	had	the	following	to	say	about	the	current	situation	of	
women	under	IS	rule:	
	
“My	family	in	Mosul	tell	me	that	life	under	Da’esh	[IS]	 is	unpredictable.	When	they	
leave	 their	 homes,	women	 have	 to	 be	 accompanied	 by	 their	male	 guardians,	 and	
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they	now	have	to	be	fully	veiled	and	covered.	You	know	how	some	[Arab]	Gulf	ladies	
wear	 their	niqab?	 You	 cannot	 even	 see	 their	 eyes,	 and	 they	 usually	 have	 to	wear	
gloves.	 It	 wasn’t	 like	 that	 in	 the	 early	 days	 of	 their	 rule,	 but	 new	 things	 are	
introduced	every	single	day.”vii	
	
Although	this	respondent	was	keen	to	stress	that	she	did	not	oppose	the	full	face	and	body	veil,	the	
niqab	 and	 its	 corresponding	 accoutrements,	 she	 rightly	 identified	 that	 such	 customs	 are	 alien	 to	
urban	Iraqis,	and	even	the	majority	of	rural	Iraqis	of	all	ethnicities,	including	the	Bedouin	Arabs.	The	
fact	that	she	alluded	to	the	strict	enforcement	of	female	dress	codes	in	the	Arab	Gulf	states,	likely	in	
reference	 to	 Saudi	 Arabian	 law,	 is	 demonstrative	 of	 a	 new	 kind	 of	 culture	 being	 imposed	 on	 the	
women	of	Mosul	by	men	whom	she	had	previously	identified	as	not	being	Iraqi	anyway.viii	
	
One	of	the	new	respondents	described	the	situation	in	Mosul	as	being	“bleak”	and	that	“the	people	
were	frightened,	scared	and	constantly	worried	about	the	future”.ix	When	enquiries	were	made	as	to	
whether	the	source	of	this	sense	of	anxiety	amongst	the	population	was	because	of	IS,	the	following	
was	said:	
	
“Yes,	 but	 also	 it	 is	 a	 lot	 deeper	 than	 that.	 Imagine	 talking	 and	 dealing	with	 those	
idiots	[IS	fighters]	on	a	daily	basis	in	order	to	acquire	the	most	basic	of	services.	Now	
imagine	 you	 hear	 that	 someone	 in	 your	 neighbourhood	 who	 was	 not	 particularly	
religious	was	 caught	 by	Da’esh	 fighters	with	 alcohol	 in	 his	 home,	 and	 that	 person	
was	not	only	executed,	but	had	his	properties	and	capital	seized.	Are	you	going	to	
want	 to	 go	 into	 your	 district	 council	 to	 make	 any	 requests?	 Even	 if	 it’s	 a	
comparatively	rare	occurrence,	that	fear	is	there.”x	
	
On	 the	 subject	 of	 property	 seizure	 and	 economic	 punishments	 inflicted	 upon	Maslawis,	 another	
respondent	who	claimed	to	have	been	a	shop	owner	in	Mosul	said	that	IS	regularly	appropriated	the	
properties	of	those	whom	they	deemed	as	their	enemies	or	as	easier	targets	who	could	be	extorted	
or	pressured	through	threats	to	their	families.		
	
“You	 know	 that’s	 partially	 how	 they	 make	 their	 money,	 right?	 [IS	 earn	 money]	
through	forced	seizure	of	the	wealth	of	those	they	brand	as	‘apostates’	or	they	have	
convicted	 of	 ‘corruption	 on	 Earth’,	which	 can	mean	 anything	 depending	 on	which	
Da’esh	operative	 is	accusing	you.	Some	of	 these	charges	we	used	to	hear	about	 in	
Iran,	and	we	used	to	laugh	at	them.	Now	we’re	being	charged	with	similar	crimes	by	
judges	who	are	like	the	kind	of	idiots	who	used	to	come	through	the	Sharia	colleges	
at	 university,xi	 and	 they	 hand	out	 sentences	 no	 one	 has	 ever	 heard	 of	 being	 used	
throughout	Islamic	history.”xii	
	
According	 to	 this	 respondent	 and	others,	 IS	 judges	would	order	 for	 defendants	 of	 smaller	 crimes,	
such	 as	 smoking,	 to	 pay	 fines	 and	 sometimes	 those	 fines	 would	 be	 extortionately	 high.	 If	 a	
defendant	was	not	able	to	pay	these	fines,	an	IS	judge	would	order	the	defendant’s	properties	seized	
in	order	to	pay	off	the	outstanding	balance.xiii	 Invariably,	this	would	mean	that	someone	could	lose	
everything	they	possessed,	and	in	a	city	that	is	under	siege	and	cut	off	from	the	rest	of	the	world	and	
at	 the	mercy	 of	 unpredictable	 extremists,	 such	 an	 individual	would	 be	 likely	 to	 suffer	 immensely.	
Meanwhile,	the	seized	property	would	either	be	granted	to	individuals	within	IS	to	foster	loyalty,	or	
would	be	put	to	other	uses	for	the	financial	and	economic	gain	of	IS.xiv	
	
In	terms	of	how	IS	functions	as	a	state	that	provides	services,	the	main	concern	that	was	highlighted	
was	 that	 of	 health.	 Several	 of	 the	 respondents	 claimed	 that	 Mosul’s	 medical	 facilities,	 including	
smaller	clinics,	had	been	bombed	in	airstrikes	carried	out	either	by	the	Iraqi	government	or	its	allied	
4	
	
Western	partners.	To	make	matters	worse,	medical	supplies	were	extremely	low	or	non-existent,	as	
medicines	 and	other	 supplies	 had	been	halted	by	Baghdad	 for	 several	 reasons,	 including	 security.	
This	problem	has	likely	been	further	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	IS	had	previously	been	known	to	
transfer	the	already	precariously	stocked	health	supplies	of	Mosul	to	Syria.xv	One	respondent,	whose	
relative	worked	in	Mosul’s	main	hospital,	said:	
	
“Health	standards	are	unbearable.	Medical	infrastructure	has	been	damaged	by	the	
bombs	 being	 dropped	 on	Mosul,	 and	 there	 are	 no	medicines.	 In	 order	 to	 acquire	
certain	medicines,	they	have	to	be	bought	from	the	black	market	where	medicines	
like	simple	painkillers	and	basic	antibiotics	like	penicillin	can	cost	several	times	their	
market	 value.	 The	 risk	 to	 getting	 medicine	 that	 way	 is	 not	 only	 financial,	 but	 if	
Da’esh	catch	you	they	might	execute	you	as	a	smuggler.	Basically,	you	or	your	family	
might	 die	 from	 a	 lack	 of	 medical	 treatment,	 or	 you	 might	 die	 for	 getting	 the	
medicines	 you	 need	 from	 a	 black	 market	 that	 is	 partially	 operated	 by	 Da’esh	
themselves.	How	do	they	expect	us	to	live?”xvi	
	
As	is	clear	from	the	brief	excerpts	above,	IS	are	not	loved	by	the	people	of	Mosul.	The	impact	of	IS’s	
method	of	rule	on	Maslawis	has	varying	effects,	depending	on	gender,	the	kind	of	businesses	people	
run,	 the	 properties	 they	 own,	 or	 even	 the	 state	 of	 their	 health	 that	 may	 compel	 them	 to	 seek	
medical	 supplies	 in	 black	markets	 that	may	 also	 buy	 them	 their	 own	deaths.	What	 appears	 to	 be	
common	amongst	all	respondents	 is	a	fear	of	what	might	happen	to	them	if	they	break	any	of	 IS’s	
myriad	rules	and	 laws	that	are	not	stable	and	that	are	 liable	 to	change	at	any	given	moment	with	
little	to	no	warning.	As	such,	a	clear	sense	of	palpable	fear	and	anxiety	combined	with	hatred	and	
disdain	for	IS	is	clear	from	the	respondents	interviewed.	
	
The	situation,	however,	may	be	somewhat	different	in	other,	smaller,	centres	under	IS	control.	With	
particular	reference	to	Hawijah,	Kurdish	 intelligence	estimates	place	the	proportion	of	 IS	members	
as	being	 from	their	 immediate	community	as	perhaps	being	as	high	as	90	percent,	with	 some	5-6	
percent	 then	 coming	 from	 other	 parts	 of	 Iraq	 or	 Syria,	 and	 a	 much	 smaller	 percentage	 being	
‘foreign’.	If	these	numbers	are	correct,	and	the	pattern	is	replicated	to	some	degree	in	Mosul,	then	
there	 may	 well	 be	 the	 potential	 for	 a	 dangerous	 internecine	 situation	 to	 unfold	 –	 between	 and	
within	Arab	tribes	and	families	as	those	associated	with	IS	are	removed	from	within,	once	it	seems	
certain	that	an	operation	to	retake	the	territory	is	underway.		
	
	
	
Attitudes	towards	the	Iraqi	government:	
	
Perhaps	unsurprisingly	to	those	who	study	contemporary	Iraqi	issues	to	any	serious	depth	is	the	fact	
that	few	Sunni	Arabs	view	the	government	and	its	allies	in	the	Popular	Mobilisation	Forces	and	other	
sectarian	Shia	organisations	as	being	any	different	 from	 IS.	The	people	of	Mosul,	 it	 seems,	do	not	
deviate	from	this	formula.	The	primary	fear	of	Maslawis	appears	to	be	not	continued	IS	rule,	but	a	
vengeful	 Shia	 army	 descending	 onto	 the	 city,	 branding	 the	 people	 as	 IS	 collaborators	 and	
sympathisers,	 and	 commencing	 a	 sectarian	 and	 genocidal	 campaign	of	 imprisonment,	 torture	 and	
murder.	 Few	 Sunni	 Arabs,	 especially	 in	 Mosul,	 will	 forget	 that	 Iraqi	 Security	 Forces	 committed	
extrajudicial	murder	of	Sunni	detainees	as	they	withdrew	in	the	face	of	IS	advances.xvii	Similarly,	few	
can	 forget	 the	graphic	 scenes	of	 Sunnis	murdered	by	Shia	 terrorist	organisations	being	hung	 from	
electricity	 poles	 in	 the	 city	 of	 Baquba,xviii	 or	 Popular	 Mobilisation	 fighters	 hanging	 Sunnis	 upside	
down	over	a	fire	and	gloating	as	they	sliced	strips	of	flesh	off	of	the	victim	with	a	sword.xix	
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The	 words	 frequently	 used	 to	 describe	 what	 the	 people	 of	 Mosul	 expect	 from	 “liberating”	 Iraqi	
government	 and	 allied	 Popular	Mobilisation	 forces	 in	 Arabic	were	mathbaha,	 ibada,	majzara	 and	
damar,	 which	 corresponds	 with	 the	 English	 slaughter,	 genocide,	 massacre	 and	 destruction	
respectively.	“By	Allah,	there	won’t	be	a	Mosul	left,	nor	anyone	that	can	be	called	a	Maslawi	by	the	
time	those	sectarian	savages	finish	with	this	city”,	said	a	former	police	officer	in	both	the	Ba’ath	era	
and	the	period	of	the	US	occupation.xx	“We	remember	al-Qaeda’s	bombings,	their	racketeering	and	
Da’esh’s	murder	of	anyone	who	contradicted	or	 resisted	 them,	even	non-violently.	But	what’s	 the	
difference	 between	 them	 and	 the	 government	 and	 its	 bloodthirsty	 gangs?	Not	 a	 single	 one	 of	 us	
[Sunnis]	 hasn’t	 lost	 someone	 to	 their	 bullets,	 blades	 and	 drills”,xxi	 said	 the	 same	 respondent	 in	
reference	 to	 the	 heavily	 documented	 use	 of	 power	 drills	 by	 Shia	militias	 to	 torture	 and	 kill	 Sunni	
detainees	and	hostages.		
	
Such	misgivings	 towards	Baghdad	and	 its	 allies	were	not	 limited	 to	 the	expression	of	 fear	of	 lives	
being	lost,	but	also	with	regard	to	women’s	rights.	Two	respondents,	both	female,	recounted	stories	
of	 how	widows	 in	 Sunni	 areas	 in	Baghdad	 and	other	 cities	were	 forced	 into	muta’a	marriages,	 or	
temporary	marriages	permitted	in	Shia	 Islam,	 in	order	to	be	able	to	provide	for	their	families	after	
the	main	breadwinners	were	killed.xxii	While	 IS	has	gained	notoriety	 for	 its	 sexual	exploitation	and	
enslavement	of	women,	Shia	militias	have	also	been	known	to	be	involved	in	the	trafficking	of	Iraqi	
women	 and	 children	 in	 order	 to	 sell	 them	 into	 sexual	 bondage.	 Essentially	 these	 temporary	
marriages	that	are	unregulated	by	Iraqi	laws	are	used	to	provide	a	veneer	of	religious	legitimacy	to	
what	is	in	effect	forced	prostitution:	
	
“We	 know	what	 happened	 to	many	 of	 those	 poor	 widows	 in	 Baghdad.	 [The	 Shia	
militias]	 have	 even	 set	 up	 brothels	 that	 have	 dozens	 of	 these	 widows	 in	 each	
location,	with	muta’a	marriages	being	officiated	by	 in-house	 Shia	 imams	who	give	
their	blessings	 to	 the	exploitation	of	 innocent	women	and	girls.	 If	 the	Shia	militias	
come	to	Mosul,	 they’ll	kill	our	men	and	sell	us	all	 into	the	sex	 trade.	 I’d	 rather	die	
than	be	disgraced	and	humiliated	for	the	rest	of	my	life.”xxiv	
	
This	paints	a	bleak	picture	not	only	of	what	Maslawi	women	fear	may	come	to	pass,	but	of	what	has	
already	 been	 occurring	 extensively	 in	 Iraq	 since	 2003.	 Although	 the	 Iraqi	 Shia	 religious	
establishment’s	 approval	 of	 muta’a	 has	 scarcely	 been	 reported	 in	 the	 media,xxv	 it	 cannot	 have	
passed	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 international	 community,	 who	 will	 be	 discussed	 presently,	 as	 many	
women’s	rights	NGOs	have	submitted	reports	to	the	United	Nations,	including	one	to	the	UN	Human	
Rights	Commission	in	February	2014.xxvi	
	
Even	the	concept	of	“liberation”	from	IS	received	much	derision:	
	
“What	liberation	are	these	idiots	from	the	West	talking	about?	They	first	‘liberated’	
us	from	Saddam,	then	they	‘liberated’	us	with	their	democracy,	then	they	‘liberated’	
us	by	giving	us	Maliki,	Abadi	and	 the	other	Green	Zone	dogs	who	slaughtered	and	
robbed	us,	and	now	they’re	talking	about	liberating	us	from	Da’esh?	What	exactly	is	
this	liberation	if	they’re	only	going	to	hand	us	over	to	psychopathic	murderers	who	
will	 commit	 genocide	 against	 us?	 They	 need	 to	 stop	 thinking	 of	 themselves	 as	
heroes	that	are	there	to	slay	monsters	and	banish	nightmares	that	they	created.”xxvii	
	
Whilst	 this	 quote	 can	 also	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 following	 section	 on	 the	 international	 community,	 it	
demonstrates	 that	many	Sunni	Arabs	believe	 that	 a	 return	 to	Baghdad’s	 control	would	be	akin	 to	
handing	over	the	fates	of	the	population	to	a	government	that	will	either	take	part	in	or	else	turn	a	
blind	 eye	 to	 a	 genocide	 of	 the	 Sunnis.	 None	 of	 the	 respondents	 demonstrated	 any	 kind	 of	 trust,	
goodwill	or	faith	in	the	central	government,	nor	did	any	of	them	praise	the	Popular	Mobilisation.	The	
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attitude	 displayed	 towards	 the	 scenario	 of	 the	 central	 government	 recapturing	Mosul	was	 simply	
one	of	jumping	out	of	the	frying	pan	of	IS	rule	and	back	into	the	fire	of	the	sectarian	government.	
	
Attitudes	towards	the	international	community:	
	
In	direct	relation	to	the	final	quote	in	the	previous	section,	Maslawis	expressed	little	trust	or	faith	in	
the	 international	 community,	 particularly	 the	 US	 and	 the	 wider	 institutions	 of	 the	 UN.	 The	 US	
invasion	in	2003	is	viewed	as	the	“original	sin”	that	led	to	what	the	respondents	feel	is	the	wholesale	
destruction	 of	 Iraq	 as	 a	 state	 and	 society.	 Many	 of	 the	 respondents	 felt	 that	 the	 US	 had	 simply	
handed	Iraq	over	to	Iran	“on	a	golden	platter”,xxviii	as	one	respondent	worded	it,	and	that	under	the	
Ba’athists	 they	 at	 least	 had	 livelihoods,	 their	 families	 and	 security,	 even	 if	 they	 lacked	 political	
freedom.		
	
While	 blaming	 the	 West	 has	 already	 been	 heavily	 covered	 in	 numerous	 publications,	 what	 is	 of	
primary	 importance	 and	 utility	 to	 this	 enquiry	 is	 how	 Maslawis	 perceive	 the	 ability	 of	 the	
international	 community,	 especially	 regional	 powers	 such	 as	 Turkey	 and	 Saudi	 Arabia,	 to	 play	 a	
positive	 role	 in	 Iraq’s	 future.	 Although	 they	 saw	 the	 US,	 Britain,	 Turkey	 and	 Saudi	 Arabia	 as	 all	
problematic	 (not	 to	 mention	 their	 profound	 hatred	 of	 Iran,	 whom	 they	 view	 as	 a	 primary	
antagonist),	they	still	viewed	them	as	more	reliable	and	trustworthy	than	their	own	government:	
	
“If	you’re	telling	me	that	they	want	to	know	what	can	be	done	to	make	us	feel	more	
at	ease	[about	IS	being	removed	from	Mosul],	then	firstly	they	should	stop	bombing	
us	 and	 using	 the	 excuse	 of	 targeting	Da’esh.	 Secondly,	why	 don’t	 they	 show	 how	
committed	they	are	and	stop	striking	from	the	skies	and	start	putting	soldiers	on	the	
ground.	The	Turks	are	already	nearby,	they	are	part	of	NATO,	so	why	can’t	they	act	
as	peacekeepers	under	a	UN	mission	like	they	do	in	Lebanon	or	in	Africa?	We	need	
international	 observers	 and	 a	 clear	 message	 sent	 to	 the	 Green	 Zone	 that	 any	
sectarian	killings	will	be	treated	as	war	crimes	and	that	the	[Iraqi]	government	will	
be	prosecuted	and	held	to	account	just	like	they	did	to	Saddam.	Otherwise,	it’s	more	
hypocrisy	dressed	up	as	care	for	us.”xxx	
	
Granting	the	fact	that	a	lot	of	mistrust	can	be	read	from	this	quotation,	this	can	also	be	seen	as	an	
entrance	 into	 regaining	 the	 trust	 of	 Iraqis,	 particularly	 Sunni	 Arabs	who	 feel	 that	 they	 have	 been	
marginalised	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 Shia	Arabs	 and	 Kurds	who	obviously	 benefited	 the	most	 from	 the	
2003	 invasion.	 These	 sentiments	were	 echoed	 by	many	 other	 respondents,	 and	 they	 believe	 that	
only	 other,	 external	 powers	 can	 effectively	 restrain	 the	 Iraqi	 Security	 Forces	 and	 Popular	
Mobilisation	from	committing	war	crimes	in	the	event	that	Mosul	is	recaptured.	
	
The	view	from	Kurdistan	
	
There	are	resident	in	the	Kurdistan	Region	a	notable	collection	of	Arab	tribal	shaikhs	who	fled	as	IS	
forces	advanced	in	2014	–	from	Hawijah,	Rabia/Shammar,	and	Sinjar	in	particular.	These	figures	give	
a	particular	view	of	what	is	happening	in	Mosul	and	Hawijah,	from	their	exiled	perspective.	Many	of	
them	present	a	view	that	IS	is	somehow	alien	to	their	people	–	which	is	detabable	–	but	what	is	very	
telling	 is	 the	way	 in	which	 they	 talk	about	Sunni	Arabs	being	dispossessed,	whether	by	 the	US-led	
invasion,	the	government	of	Iraq,	or	IS,	and	how	their	areas	have	been	destroyed,	and	will	be	even	
more	so	during	and	after	any	campaign	to	remove	IS.		
	
These	figures	also	display	a	very	great	concern	about	the	Hashed	al-Sha’abi,	and	what	they	may	do	
when	they	enter	IS-controlled	territory.	What	they	tended	to	prefer	to	see	was	the	creation	of	some	
form	of	Sunni	Arab	tribal	militia,	maybe	as	part	of	the	 ISF,	which	would	be	used	to	secure	the	city	
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following	 IS	 removal.	Of	 course,	 however,	 the	different	 Sunni	Arab	 tribes	 are	 falling	 into	different	
spheres	of	political	influence,	with	some	having	moved	into	a	group	around	KDP	President	Barzani,	
whereas	others	seem	to	be	attempting	to	negotiate	a	closer	arrangement	with	 Iraqi	PM	Haidar	al-
Abadi.	These	fractured	strategies	may	well	end	up	either	damaging	the	cohesion	of	any	assault	on	IS,	
or	complicating	‘the	day	after’	scenarios	as	they	unfold.		
	
A	further	development	in	Kurdistan	focuses	upon	where	President	Barzani	would	intend	to	position	
his	 own	 peshmerga	 in	 any	 such	 conflict.	 Increasingly,	 it	 seems	 as	 if	 Barzani	 is	 keen	 to	 bring	 the	
peshmerga	into	the	eastern	side	of	Mosul,	where	there	was	a	largely	Kurdish	population	that	would	
be,	it	seems,	largely	supportive	of	him.	While	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	a	Kurdish	occupation	of	eastern	
Mosul,	it	seems	that	this	discussion	is	occurring	more	often	in	the	KDP	leadership,	and	is	reflected	in	
the	tactical	movement	of	KDP	peshmerga	forces	in	recent	weeks.	Why	should	they	do	this?	Any	such	
annexation	of	eastern	Mosul	would	be	driven	by	 internal	Kurdish	political	dynamics.	Currently,	the	
areas	into	which	the	Kurds	have	expanded	have	been	mainly	to	the	south-east,	in	PUK	territory,	and	
if	 these	 territories,	 and	especially	Kirkuk,	were	 to	 join	 the	KRI	 in	 any	 future	 referendum,	 then	 the	
KDP	would	see	 its	relative	popularity	weaken.	But	 if	Kirkuk	were	to	be	balanced	by	eastern	Mosul,	
then	the	situation	would	be	much	more	even.	Some	Kurdish	maximalist	maps	show	the	boundary	of	
the	KRI	should	then	follow	the	Tigris	to	the	Jabal	Hamrin,	thus	bringing	in	a	very	significant	part	of	
Nineveh	into	the	KRI.		
	
Why	 is	 this	 important	 for	day	after	scenarios	 in	Mosul.	 In	short,	any	notion	of	a	Kurdish	territorial	
annexation	 of	 eastern	Mosul	 and	 significant	 parts	 of	Nineveh	 could	well	 cause	 serious	 opposition	
among	Sunni	Arabs	and	Turkmens,	as	well	as	among	Shi’i	militias,	thus	complicating	any	attempts	to	
bring	stability	to	the	post-conflict	environment.		
	
	
Conclusion:	
	
As	 the	 above	 survey	 shows,	 the	 people	 of	 Mosul	 are	 extremely	 fearful	 of	 a	 post-IS	 Mosul.	 The	
respondents	 firmly	 believe	 that	 the	 Iraqi	 government	 and	 its	 allied	 Shia	 militias,	 particularly	 the	
Popular	Mobilisation	Forces,	will	not	have	liberation	in	mind	when	they	attempt	to	recapture	Mosul,	
but	vengeance.	The	Popular	Mobilisation	Forces	have	frequently	perpetrated	brutal	excesses	against	
the	Sunni	population,	whether	 in	Tikrit,	Ramadi,	 Tal	Afar,	 Jurf	 al-Sakhr,	Muqdadiya	or	many	other	
places,	and	Maslawis	are	acutely	aware	of	this.	They	believe,	and	not	without	good	reason,	that	the	
sectarianism	that	 is	 rampant	and	pervasive	 in	both	the	Popular	Mobilisation	and	the	 Iraqi	Security	
Forces	will	 lead	these	“liberating”	forces	to	accuse	the	Maslawis,	 themselves	victims	of	 IS	violence	
and	oppression,	of	being	IS	sympathisers	or	collaborators.	As	many	have	seen	in	the	Shia	on	Sunni	
violence	 in	 Diyala,	 it	 is	 usually	 enough	 to	 be	 Sunni	 to	 be	 accused	 of	 being	 an	 IS	 collaborator	 and	
killed	for	it.	
	
However,	 it	 is	 also	 clear	 that	 they	 feel	 strong	 anti-IS	 sentiments	 and	wish	 to	 see	 them	 gone	 and	
replaced,	as	long	as	it	is	not	replacing	IS	tyranny	with	a	return	to	the	tyranny	of	Baghdad’s	sectarian	
policies	 and	 the	 free	 rein	 granted	 to	 sectarian	 Shia	 militias	 and	 organisations	 that	 are	 directly	
supported	and	controlled	by	Iran.	What	is	interesting	is	that,	although	they	blame	the	international	
community	 and	particularly	 the	US	 and	 its	 allies	 for	 the	 situation	 of	 Iraq	 today,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	
people	 of	 Mosul	 would	 support	 an	 international	 force,	 including	 Arab	 and	 Turkish	 soldiers,	 in	
securing	the	city	after	IS	is	forced	to	withdraw.	This	is	because	they	see	this	as	the	best	solution	to	
ensuring	 that	 the	 Iraqi	 Security	 Forces	 and	 Popular	 Mobilisation	 Forces	 will	 be	 restrained	 from	
exacting	 bloody	 and	misplaced	 reprisals	 against	 the	 population.	 According	 to	 the	 snapshot	 image	
produced	by	this	paper,	only	with	such	international	forces	will	the	people	of	Mosul	see	the	purge	of	
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IS	 from	 the	 city	 as	 a	 liberation	 rather	 than	 simply	 Baghdad	 recapturing	 it	 and	 subjecting	 it	 to	 a	
different	kind	of	oppression.	
	
Whether	the	international	community,	principally	the	US,	has	the	stomach	for	another	intervention	
in	 Iraq,	 even	 if	 it	 is	 a	 peacekeeping	 operation,	 is	 highly	 debatable.	 However,	 without	 such	 a	
peacekeeping	mission,	 the	world	 risks	 very	 recent	history	 repeating	 itself	 in	 Iraq.	 Just	 as	al-Qaeda	
spawned	IS,	a	mutated	and	even	more	extreme	version	of	itself,	no	one	can	be	certain	about	what	IS	
may	 bring	 forth	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 its	 defeat,	 and	 indeed	 if	 such	 an	 organisation	 will	 be	 even	more	
violent,	even	more	capricious	and	even	more	brutal	than	IS	 itself.	Such	a	scenario	 is	one	that	does	
not	 bear	 thinking	 about,	 yet	 the	 international	 community	must	 consider	 it	 deeply	 if	 they	wish	 to	
restore	 order	 to	 the	 region	 and	 begin	 to	 curtail	 the	 rise	 and	 propagation	 of	 violent	 extremist	
organisations,	Sunni,	Shia	or	otherwise.	
	
Tallha	 Abdulrazaq	 is	 a	 PhD	 student	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Exeter.	 Gareth	 Stansfield	 is	 Professor	 of	
Middle	East	Politics	at	the	University	of	Exeter.	
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xvi	Participant	J	
xvii	Amnesty	International,	‘Iraq:	Testimonies	point	to	dozens	of	revenge	killings	of	Sunni	detainees’,	2014,	
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/06/iraq-testimonies-point-dozens-revenge-killings-sunni-
detainees	
xviii	Michael	Georgy,	‘Shi’ite	militias	hangs	up	15	executed	Sunnis	in	Iraqi	square’,	Reuters,	2014,	
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-idUSKBN0FZ1VL20140730	
xix	Mamoon	Alabbasi,	‘VIDEO:	Iraq	Shia	militiaman	cuts	burnt	corpse	“like	shawarma”’,	Middle	East	Eye,	2015,	
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/video-iraq-shia-militiaman-cuts-burnt-corpse-shawarma-814719537	
xx	Participant	H	
xxi	Ibid.	
xxii	Participants	B	and	K	
xxiv	Participant	K	
xxv	Tallha	Abdulrazaq,	‘What	form	of	“Islam”	do	these	terrorists	follow?’,	Middle	East	Eye,	2015,		
xxvi	NGOs	Coalition	of	CEDAW	Shadow	Report,	‘Iraqi	Women	in	Armed	Conflict	and	Post	Conflict	Situation:	
Shadow	Report	submitted	to	the	CEDAW	committee	at	the	57th	Session’,	UNOHCHR,	2014,	
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/IRQ/INT_CEDAW_NGO_IRQ_16192_E.pdf	
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